Analysis: How long can Iran’s regime fight on?

LONDON: When the US and Israel launched their joint attack on Iran on Feb. 28, some 59 percent of gamblers on the controversial predictions site Polymarket wagered the Iranian regime would survive Operation Epic Fury.

As of Monday, 99 percent are now betting on the regime’s survival. Just 1 percent believe the regime will fall by the end of June.

On Feb. 28, as Israeli and US weapons rained down on Iran, 55 percent wagered the regime would collapse by the end of 2027. By Monday, just 13 percent backed that proposition.

Indeed, with the ebb and flow of ceasefires, continued missile exchanges, the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the US-Iran war passing its 100-day mark, the Iranian regime does not appear to be facing imminent collapse.

“Undoubtedly, the US and Israeli escalation against Iran has put both the Iranian economy and security under immense strain, but we cannot definitively state that this will be an existential threat to the regime’s survival,” said Caroline Rose, a senior director at the Soufan Center.

“History has shown us that the Iranian regime has reflected deep resiliency amid the impact of international sanctions, water shortages, infrastructural challenges, and social unrest.”

Reports from inside Iran reflect “disillusionment and despair” among Iranians who had hoped that the US-Israeli attacks at the end of February signalled that the end of the regime was imminent.

Now, as The New York Times reported on Sunday, “after devastating strikes and amid a teetering ceasefire, those hopes have been snuffed out.

“Feelings of disillusionment and despair have taken their place, driven by a reported death toll of 1,700 civilians, vast destruction and an economic implosion that has made daily life a struggle.”

According to interviews carried out before the weekend’s strikes with more than 20 Iranians in Tehran, Isfahan, Ahvaz and Mashhad, “the on-again, off-again peace talks, along with US proclamations that the war is over when it’s not, has left both supporters and opponents of the government confused and anxious.”

But confusion and anxiety, said Rose, poses no threat to the regime.

“While this duress has incited social agitation and dissatisfaction, occasionally culminating in anti-governmental protests and demonstrations, the regime has thus far survived, in part thanks to the monopoly that Iranian security institutions have imposed over daily life,” she said.

There is, said Sir John Jenkins, former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Burma, and consul-general in Jerusalem, no doubt that the Iranian economy “is in a shocking state.”

“Currency collapse, massive inflation, huge damage to industrial capacity and production, a squeeze on already limited oil exports, damage to wells and fields and of course the internet shutdown,” he said.

“Plus the chronic water crisis and environmental degradation more generally. But they’ve cracked down on domestic dissent even harder than before — big increases in arrests and executions, and there are lots of young basijis (paramilitary volunteers) on the streets.

“And given that the US seems reluctant to escalate and Israel has limited short-term options without US support, I’m pretty sure the regime can survive for the moment.”

Although Iran has undoubtedly seen its military infrastructure and stockpiles seriously degraded since Feb. 28, the extent to which it has both bounced back and remained dangerously armed has surprised US intelligence agencies.

According to US intelligence assessments leaked to The New York Times and the Washington Post, by mid-May Iran had repaired 30 of its 33 missiles sites overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, “still fields about 70 percent of its mobile launchers across the country and has retained roughly 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile.”

If true, these assessments are at odds with repeated statements by both President Donald Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth that Iran’s military capability had been decimated.

On Sunday and Monday, Iran and Israel exchanged fire for the first time since the ceasefire was agreed on April 8. Israel suspended its strikes after a very public intervention by President Trump, who posted on Truth Social: “Israel and Iran must immediately stop ‘shooting’.”

“My read of the situation right now is that Iran is in a much stronger position than the US, and I think that that is actually quite obvious from its behavior,” said Andrew Gawthorpe, lecturer in history and international relations at Leiden University and author of the Substack newsletter America Explained.

“You can see that Iran is frequently willing to take risks in the conflict, to re-escalate things, as it did the other day.

“Trump always seems to back down in the face of these challenges, and I think that that reflects the fact that his domestic position is very difficult, and it’s only getting more difficult as time goes on, because as the midterm elections approach the economy is going to be a huge issue.”

The Iranians, he said, “are calculating that the longer this drags on, the more likely they are to get concessions that they want out of Trump, whereas he is in a rush to try to solve it as quickly as possible.”

It is, said Sanam Vakil, director of the MENA program at Chatham House, “quite clear that the regime is surviving. But how this war ends is so important for the leadership in Iran, because they recognize that survival on its own is not a guarantee for success.

“They need to be able to translate survival into an agreement that can guarantee economic rehabilitation, and through that they will be able to have increased domestic political legitimacy.”

Inevitably, she said, “the war will end, and it is now a question of the terms and conditions of that end, which could take one of three forms.

“One is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that lays the groundwork for a longer negotiation process on the other issues, pertaining to Iran’s role in the region and its nuclear program.

“A second way this ends is an MOU that lays the groundwork for further negotiations, but that those further negotiations are never concluded, and so we remain in a situation similar to that in Gaza, stuck in a process for process’s sake.

“The third outcome is that we just sort of stay where we are — no war, no peace, and this plays out.”

The best outcome for the Gulf states, she added, “is scenario one, that we get an MOU, preferably over the next month, and then the region creates a scaffold for a process that leads to a broader resolution.

“Without that, if regional rivalries and fractures, alongside the domestic challenges facing Iran and the US, prevent a broader deal, we’ll be stuck in this cycle of conflict.

“It can be contained, but we’ll see flare-ups, and those flare-ups are always dangerous and will impact the regional economic and security order.”

Sir John believes that, while “this is going to be a long game,” the potency of the leverage Iran is currently enjoying will ultimately expire.”

“The regime may think that using Hormuz as a protection racket compensates to an extent,” he said. “But even if that was accepted, it wouldn’t make up for everything else.

“And I can’t see any state — regionally or internationally — accepting it.”

Although it is currently weathering the storm, albeit badly battered, “Iran has alienated all its neighbors and is not making China happy. Israel can do that and get away with it. I don’t think Iran can.

“In the short term, oil and gas consumers will look for fixes and over the next five to 20 years, the GCC will build alternative export infrastructure. So Hormuz is a wasting asset and in the same period, the Iranian economy will suffer.”

Trump, he adds, “may lose interest. But that’s not necessarily a plus for Tehran.” Ironically, “they need his attention.”